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Transatlantic Divisions in Methods of Inquiry About Law: What it Means 
for International Law 
John Linarelli* 
In philosophy graduate school, someone – usually the faculty member leading the discus-
sion - offers the counterargument to the young crowd who see disagreement everywhere 
that we humans agree on a lot we take for granted.1 The claim is usually offered as a basic 
one too often ignored because so obviously true though if you read some of the standard 
corpus in philosophy of language you might discover the claim is not so obvious. Anyone 
who has taken a seminar on Wittgenstein knows the story. Another possible line of inquiry 
about what we agree on can be found in meta-ethics but going there will lead us astray. 
The basic point of the story is not to puzzle over the peculiarities of philosophical ques-
tions but to suggest that humans often misperceive what they share or do not share as com-
mon understandings. It is or should certainly be obvious that legal scholars (and people 
generally) agree on many things. You are reading this chapter because we share a language 
and are socialized in ways of expressing ideas in an academic context. But we also make 
mistakes along the way. Language runs out – it can only take us so far. A tribal cognition 
hard wired into our brains probably triggers when we speak the same language, character-
ize our legal systems in a common history or culture, or rely on similar kinds of sources 
* Professor of Law, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center (2019-20).
1 The origins of this discussion probably go back at least to John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Under-
standing, in which Locke argues that ideas are private to persons and that persons use language to convey 
these ideas to others. Locke’s argument sparked a significant debate in analytical philosophy beyond our 
scope here. See A.P. Martinich, The Philosophy of Language (Oxford University Press 2001): 501-508. 
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for positive law. But if we begin to take a closer look, we will find the differences in meth-
ods of inquiry about the law, including about international law, as between the United 
Kingdom, the wider Europe, and the United States can be significant. And, as we shall see, 
the differences are not entirely internal to academic inquiry about the law itself but align 
with approaches to inquiry in the social sciences. 
These differences are reflected at the outset even in the language we use to describe 
what we do. We do not even agree on what it is we call what we do. In Britain it is called 
“research” but in the United States it is called “scholarship”. This difference may have 
something to do with the fact that there is a course in the American law school curriculum 
on legal research, meant to teach aspiring practicing lawyers how to conduct research into 
the law for practice. Or, it may have to do with a narrower conception of “research” as 
something scientists and not lawyers do, and law is not a science to an American legal 
scholar unless you apply some science external to the law to it – such as economics. We 
may never know the causes of these etymological differences. To avoid confusion, this 
chapter will use “inquiry” or similar when practical. 
In some contexts continental European legal methods are closer to American legal 
methods of inquiry than British ones, but usually in a minority of approaches connecting 
the social sciences in which an American neo-positivist approach to social science has 
tended to dominate, such as in law and economics, which has made inroads in Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain.2 Law and economics is an almost non-existent subject in 
the British legal academy, probably because American scholars who do this line of work 
took the United Kingdom for granted as “like us,” an unwarranted assumption. It will be 
2 Thomas S Ulen & Nuno Goroupa, ‘The Market for Legal Innovation: Law and Economics in Europe and 
the United States’ (2008) 59 Alabama Law Review 1555. 
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difficult in this short chapter to extend too far into Europe because each national system 
places international law in a national context. For example, the German concept of inter-
national law as German public law is a very long and substantial tradition in Germany but 
not or less so elsewhere. To keep matters tractable, my focus will be on the United King-
dom and the United States. 
This chapter places the differences in traditions of inquiry about the law in general and 
international law more particularly into two frames, one based in the rise of the analytical 
and empirical sciences in the United States and the other in the rise of the critical tradition 
in the wake of American Legal Realism. Some have offered other explanations, such as 
those grounded in different educational systems between various countries3 but when one 
begins to dig more deeply into the question one will find these explanations to be superfi-
cial or just a description of an effect of some other more coherent account. Of course, the 
following is an exercise in interpretation, but at least a plausible one. 
This chapter proceeds on an assumption that to understand how international legal 
scholars perceive their methods is to be explored from the perspective of the history of the 
social sciences and the humanities generally. The chapter does not offer a historical inves-
tigation into inquiry about international law as distinct from approaches to inquiry about 
domestic law. It is an exercise in placing the current work of international legal scholars in 
the context in which they operate within the broader university and community of scientists 
and humanists. It does not offer a history of intellectual thought about international law or 
international jurisprudence and the reader should consult others for such history.4  
3 For a discussion and critique of these issues, see ibid., 1593-1597. 
4 An excellent start would be with Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentler Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall 
of International Law 1870-1960 (Cambridge University Press 2001).  
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I. SOCIAL SCIENCE AND “PROGRESS” 
Methods of inquiry in the social sciences have differed within countries to various degrees 
throughout the history of the social sciences. Between countries, some differences are gen-
eralizable and could be said to reflect something of a national tradition, though these tradi-
tions are by no means without exception and they are starting to dissolve. We can reason-
ably refer to traditions in the social science as more or less influential in various countries 
but cannot say much more. We cannot account for a substantial history of the social sci-
ences within the bounds of this chapter. 
Why differences persist as between American and European social sciences has been 
the subject of study by historians of the social sciences.5 We can summarize their conclu-
sions. In the United States we see the dominance of the analytical and empirical social 
sciences, in the grip of a robust empiricism, seeking to explain social phenomena, to pro-
duce a set of nomothetical theories to predict, and to make the unit of analysis the individual 
and the science about individual choice. Positivistic approaches to science were influential 
in Europe and the United States in the late nineteenth century but waned in Europe and 
persisted in the United States into the 20th century even as logical positivism was discred-
ited in philosophy.  By the 1920s, many social scientists in the United States saw their task 
as engaging in ‘rigorous empirical investigation, to quantify wherever possible, usually in 
5 Roger E Backhouse & Philippe Fontaine eds, A Historiography of Modern Social Science (Cambridge 
University Press 2014); Dorothy Ross, Origins of American Social Science (Cambridge University Press 
2008); George Steinmetz ed, The Politics of Method in the Human Sciences: Positivism and Epistemological 
Others (Duke University Press 2005); Theodore M. Porter & Dorothy Ross eds, The Cambridge History of 
Science, Vol 7: The Modern Social Sciences (Cambridge University Press 2003); Thomas L Haskell, The 
Emergence of Professional Social Science (Johns Hopkins University 1997); Mary O Furner, Advocacy and 
Objectivity: A Crisis in the Professionalization of American Social Science (University of Kentucky Press 
1975). 
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the form of statistics, and to build towards a disciplinary framework of universal laws.’6 
Contrast Germany, where positivism became problematic because elites adhered to the hu-
manistic ideal of bildung, the self-cultivation of character and high culture, a route for elites 
to maintain power as they were confronted with the growing power of the natural sciences.7 
Between the wars, European social sciences suffered in the hands of war, the rise of social-
ism and fascism, extreme nationalism, traditional university structures, and state and aca-
demic body restrictions largely absent from the American college and university system. 
At the time, England (and probably Scotland too) was stuck in the grip of the power of the 
private corporation – an Oxbridge caste system. In this period, the American project in the 
social sciences to imitate the natural sciences continued in a growing college and university 
system. Historians say that the scientism in the American social sciences came from an 
ethos of American individualism and democracy and the ‘naturalistic bias of American 
exceptionalism.’8 The individualistic methodological assumptions of empirical social sci-
ence worked well with the American liberal individualist conception of society and the 
aims of American government ideals in a technocratic bureaucracy.9 European social sci-
ence in contrast took a more historical and philosophical approach, with Marxism ever 
present, and with a wider focus on social theory that focused on structure. 
After the War, European universities imported the American empirical approaches but 
still there was some disengagement and resistance. Today diversity exists in both America 
6 Dorothy Ross, ‘Changing Contours of the Social Science Disciplines’ in Porter & Ross, n 5, at 205, 215-
216. 
7 Ibid, 216 
8 Ibid, 219. 
9 Ibid, 222 
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and Europe, with the differences based in whether one uses ‘analytical’ and empirical ap-
proaches aligning with science or hermeneutical and interpretivist approaches focusing on 
history and the particularities of human experience.10 But still, it would be difficult to say 
that there is no majority-minority tradition in social science trajectories. Clearly in the 
United States, the methods of positive science still predominate in the tier R1 research 
universities.11 Funding priorities are in these areas, as are the high impact journals. The US 
National Science Foundation (NSF) priorities in the social sciences are currently in the 
‘social, behavioral and economic sciences’ or SBE for short. The NSF website as of the 
date of this writing states that ‘SBE scientists develop and employ rigorous methods to 
discover fundamental principles of human behaviour at levels ranging from cells to society, 
from neurons to neighbourhoods, and across space and time.’12 NSF’s early commitment 
in the 1950s was to fund social science research that met the standards of ‘objectivity, 
verifiability, and generality’.13 Research in typical political science department in the typ-
ical American first tier research intensive university will be substantially more empirical 
than in a typical politics department in the United Kingdom. The political theorist tends to 
be a solitary figure in the American department. American political science journals also 
tend to be much more empirically focused. Note the difference in the discipline even in its 
name. In Britain, a longstanding Oxbridge tradition of the philosophical and historical 
study of politics opposed the import of political science methods, resulting in the creation 
10 Ibid, 236-37. 
11 On the Carnegie classification of institutions of higher education, see http://carnegieclassifica-
tions.iu.edu/classification descriptions/basic.php (last accessed 8 July 2019). 
12 https://www.nsf.gov/dir/index.jsp?org=SBE (last accessed 8 July 2019). 
13 Mark Solovey & Jefferson D Pooley, ‘The Price of Success: Sociologist Harry Alpert, the NSF’s First 
Social Science Policy Architect’ (2010) Annals of Science 1. 
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of the British Political Studies Association.14 Sociology started in Europe but greatly ex-
panded and became more empirical in the United States. Sociology did not become a major 
social science in Britain until the 1960s.15 The cognitive revolution, which has its genesis 
in the United States, is the study of human cognition in psychology and in a new discipline 
known as cognitive science in a way that permits researchers to break through the bound-
aries of what is now discredited behaviorism, in search of mental states and mental repre-
sentations that can be reliably discovered and predicted as causing humans to behave in 
particular ways.16 Biology is now respectfully extended into the social sciences in fields 
such as neuroscience and socio-biology.17  
Economics deserves special mention because of its relative importance in American 
legal inquiry. There was never much of a postmodern resistance in economics. While other 
social science disciplines were experiencing some foment in the 1960s, James M Buchanan 
and Gordon Tullock’s, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional 
Democracy, was first published in 1962.18 The Calculus of Consent sits at the apex of the 
most strident libertarian institutionalist vision of the study of economics and politics. It is 
the origins of public choice theory – the economic study of politics – and Buchanan went 
on to receive the Nobel Prize for his work in the field. The Atlantic describes Buchanan as 
the ‘architect of the radical right’ in the United States.19 Another key text in the United 
14 Ross, in Porter & Ross, n 5, at 233. 
15 British Sociological Association, ‘What is Sociology?’, https://www.britsoc.co.uk/what-is-sociology/ori-
gins-of-sociology.aspx (last accessed 8 July 2019) 
16 See Paul Thagard, Mind: Introduction to Cognitive Science (2nd ed MIT Press 2005). 
17 See Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind (Penguin 2012)(on criticisms and eventual acceptance of work 
by EO Wilson).  
18 James M Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional 
Democracy (University of Michigan Press 1962). 
19 Sam Tanenhaus, ‘The Architect of the Radical Right’, The Atlantic (July/August 2017). 
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States, for both economics and law and economics, is Milton Friedman’s ‘The Methodol-
ogy of Positive Economics,’ a locus classicus on how to do empirical social science in the 
classic Popperian sense of theory building, hypothesis testing, and falsification.20 
In a text designed for a seminar for Harvard School of Government undergraduates, 
Ken Shepsle & Mark Bonchek summarize the trajectory of the study of politics in the 
United States as follows: 
[T]he political science that a college student at the end of World War II 
might have encountered was primarily descriptive and judgmental. It was 
much less oriented toward explanation and analysis. Over the next twenty 
years, political scientists got even better at description. They learned data-
collection skills enabling more precise measurement, and statistical skills 
enabling more precise inferences about causal relationships. But it was not 
until the late 1960s that systematic attention began to focus on questions of 
“why.” “Why?” is the principal interrogative of science; answers to it are 
explanations, and getting to explanations requires analysis. 
The transformation of the study of politics from storytelling and anecdote 
swapping, first to thick descriptions and history writing, then to systematic 
measurement, and more recently to explanation and analysis, constitutes 
significant movement along a scientific trajectory.21  
This quote is interpretation itself of how social science gets done. It is mistaken in portray-
ing progress in the social sciences. The quote reflects the standard logical empiricist ac-
count: that social science had no real trajectory until the methods of science took over. This 
line of thinking, more prevalent in the United States than Europe but still widely adhered 
globally, has its origins in Auguste Comte, the founder of the discipline of sociology, who 
argued that progress in the study of social world passed through three stages: theological, 
philosophical, and scientific.22 In this view of the history of social science, moving onto 
20 Milton Friedman, ‘The Methodology of Positive Economics’ in Milton Friedman, ‘Essays In Positive Eco-
nomics’ (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1966) 3. 
21 Kenneth A Shepsle & Mark S Boncheck, Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions (WW 
Norton 1997): 7-8. 
22 Auguste Comte, Course on Positive Philosophy (1830); see Michel Bourdeau, ‘Auguste Comte’, The Stan-
ford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 ed), Edward N Zalta (ed), https://plato.stanford.edu/ar-
chives/sum2018/entries/comte/ (last accessed 8 July 2019).    
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the methods of the natural sciences in the study of persons and society – to make the study 
more scientific - is progress – a history of increasingly better predictions and explanations 
of why people behave the way they do, with the older methods being shed as bad science 
of myth. It is more sensible to understand the practice of science as Thomas Kuhn did, in 
its historical context as reflecting the consensus of the scientific community of the time.23 
Newtonian physics may have been replaced but it is still reliable science in many respects. 
This story about progress and the trajectory of the social sciences has something to do 
with why American, British, and European legal research diverge in key respects. Of 
course, American approaches to the social sciences will have influenced the American 
study of law. A core difference just might be the reconceptualization of ‘legal analysis’ 
itself. The concept of legal analysis seems so obvious to lawyers that we all think we agree 
on its meaning. But a group of legal scholars at the Harvard Law School seem to have 
developed a very specific meaning for the term, deviating from its ordinary usage. Start 
with Harvard’s Journal of Legal Analysis. This journal was started not by legal conceptu-
alists, but by law and economics scholars are Harvard. Its competitor is likely the Chicago’s 
The Journal of Legal Studies, a journal very much in the law and economics tradition. 
Move on to teaching at Harvard. The casebook, Analytical Methods for Lawyers, arose 
from the authors’ ‘joint realization that the traditional law school curriculum, with its focus 
on the development of analogical reasoning skills and legal writing and research, left many 
students inadequately prepared for upper-level courses and, more importantly, for legal 
23 Thomas S Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press 1962); Thomas S 
Kuhn, The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change (University of  Chicago 
Press 1977). 
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practice in the modern world’.24 The book contains chapters on decision analysis, games 
and information, contracting in an economic sense, accounting, finance, microeconomics, 
economic analysis of law, and statistics. Of course, the Harvard Law School is a big tent. 
Joseph Singer’s ‘Normative Methods for Lawyers’ appears to be a response, arguing for 
more focus in legal inquiry and in the classroom on issues of rights and justice.25 Singer’s 
complaint appears to be against the classic Benthamite labelling of justice as ‘rhetorical’ 
in law and economics, or a form of unexamined moral relativism or scepticism that is 
simply false. According to Singer, ‘law professors and students are in need of advice about 
how to think about the nature of morality, fairness, and justice. More importantly, they 
need vocabulary for talking about normative matters and a set of resources and methodol-
ogies for structuring relevant arguments’.26 To be contrasted with these re-conceptions of 
legal analysis in the United States along the lines of positive science are the more historical 
and philosophical approaches one might find at Oxford, where we are more likely to find 
a closer allegiance to the tools of the traditional doctrinalist, a coverage of law as a disci-
pline on its own, and a focus on rules and the reasoning of judges as a practice internal to 
the law itself. The ideas in Ward Farnsworth’s, The Legal Analyst: A Toolkit for Thinking 
About the Law27 might be mainstream in the United States but would be an alien invasion 
at least in some traditional quarters of legal education in Britain. 
Socio-legal studies in the United Kingdom might seem to offer a bridge to interdisci-
plinarity in the United States but that may be more to law and society research in the United 
24 Howell E Jackson, Louis Kaplow, Steven M Shavell, W Kip Viscusi, & David Cope, Analytical Methods 
for Lawyers (3rd ed. Foundation 2017) v. 
25 Joseph William Singer, ‘Normative Methods for Lawyers’ (2009) 56 UCLA Law Review 899. 
26 Ibid, 905 (footnotes omitted). 
27 Ward Farnsworth, The Legal Analyst: A Toolkit for Thinking About the Law (University of Chicago Press 
2007). 
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States and to a newer movement known as New Legal Realism, though New Legal Realism 
has encountered some European resistance.28 Socio-legal studies has developed as a dis-
tinct field in the United Kingdom, though its boundaries are blurred. It does not exist in the 
United States under a socio-legal studies designation. The distinctiveness in the United 
Kingdom might be partly driven by the funding of socio-legal studies by the UK Economic 
and Social Research Council. If we investigate empirically, we are likely to find the trends 
in British socio-legal studies tending to be more in the nature of social theory or qualitative 
if it is empirical with American research trending towards but not exclusively quantitative 
and engaged in the investigation of narrower questions using the technical competences of 
econometrically trained scholars.  An influential forum in the United States for such work 
is the Society for Empirical Legal Studies and the globally influential Journal of Empirical 
Legal Studies. The JELS is known to be inclined towards law and economics and quanti-
tative methods.29  A Law PhD culture does not exist in the United States with few excep-
tions. An established route into the American legal academy is the JD-PhD route, with the 
28 In 2015, the Leiden Journal of International Law published a symposium issue on new legal realism and 
international law. Gregory Shaffer, ‘The New Legal Realist Approach to International Law’ (2015) 28 Leiden 
Journal of International Law  189; Jakob VH Holtermann & Mikael Rask Madsen, ‘European New Legal 
Realism and International Law: How to Make International Law Intelligible’ (2015) 28 Leiden Journal of 
International Law  211; Andrew Lang, ‘New Legal Realism, Empiricism, and Scientism: The Relative Ob-
jectivity of Law and Social Science’ (2015) 28 Leiden Journal of International Law 231; Alexandra Hunees, 
‘Human Rights Between Jurisprudence and Social Science’ (2015) 28 Leiden Journal of International Law 
255; Daniel Bodansky, ’Legal Realism and its Discontents’ (2015) 28 Leiden Journal of International Law 
267. The following issued dealt with some criticisms. Ino Augsberg, ‘Some Realism about New Legal Real-
ism: What’s New, What’s Legal, What’s Real?’ (2015) 28 Leiden Journal of International Law  457; Jan 
Klabbers, ‘Whatever Happened to Gramsci? Some Reflections on New Legal Realism’ (2015) 28 Leiden 
Journal of International Law  469; Gregory Shaffer, ‘New Legal Realism’s Rejoinder’ (2015) 28 Leiden 
Journal of International Law 479.    
29 See Elizabeth Mertz & Mark Suchman, ‘A New Legal Empiricism: Assessing ELS and NLR’ (2010) 6 
Annual Review of Law and Social Science 555.  
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PhD often in economics of some other social science, while the lack of empirical skills in 
the British legal academy is well understood.30  
How have these disciplinary trajectories affected international law? In the United 
States, it has produced a proliferation of instrumentalist inquiry about international law. 
The New Haven School of policy science arose in the wake of American Legal Realism, 
started by Myres McDougal, a Yale law professor, and Harold Lasswell, a Yale political 
scientist.31 This is not the place to explore the history of the economics of international law 
in any depth but it is worth noting the use of logit regression as early as 1997 in an article 
published in the American Journal of International Law.32 Interdisciplinary moves to con-
nect primarily American approaches to international relations, grounded in positive sci-
ence, to international law, have come in several waves, starting in 1989, with the latest in 
2012.33 A review of the collection of papers by Jeffrey Dunoff and Mark Pollack on inter-
national law and international relations noted the focus of the papers on a narrow grouping 
of American scholars.34 Steven Ratner and Anne-Marie Slaughter convened a Symposium 
30 Methods: Capacity Building Resource in Interdisciplinary Research Methodology for Social Sciences, 
Methodological Challenges, Socio-Legal Empirical Research,  https://www.create.ac.uk/methods/methodo-
logical-challenges/socio-legal-empirical-research/ (last accessed 9 July 2019). 
31 For surveys, see Harold Hongju Koh, ‘Is There a “New” New Haven School of International Law?’ (2007) 
32 Yale Journal of international Law 559; W Michael Reisman, Siegfried Wiessner, & Andrew R Willard, 
‘The New Haven School: An Introduction’ (2007) 32 Yale Journal of International Law 575. 
32 Richard Steinberg, ‘Trade-Environment Negotiations in the EU, NAFTA and WTO: Regional Trajectories 
of Rule Development’ (1997) 91 American Journal of International Law 231. 
33 Kenneth W Abbott, ‘Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers’ 
(1989) 14 Yale Law Journal of International Law 335; Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, ‘International Law and 
International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda’ (1993) 87 American Journal of International Law 205; 
Jeffrey Dunoff & Mark A Pollack, Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International 
Relations: The State of the Art (Cambridge University Press 2012). 
34 Monika Zalnieriute, ‘Book Review, Jeffrey Dunoff & Mark A Pollack, Interdisciplinary Perspectives on 
International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art (Cambridge University Press 2012)’ 
(2013) 24 European Journal of International Law 987. 
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on Methods in International Law that was published in the American Journal of Interna-
tional Law with a further volume added as a book in 2004.35 This symposium and the book 
offered contributions on legal positivism, international relations theory, law and econom-
ics, the Yale School, new international legal process, feminism, and third world approaches 
to international law (TWAIL). Martti Koskenniemi’s ‘Letter to the Editors of the Sympo-
sium’, submitted in lieu of a contribution, should be essential reading in any coverage of 
method in international law, expressing as it does a frustration with the instrumentalism 
dominant in American legal scholarship, exposing gaps in coverage such as in overlooking 
the work of David Kennedy and others, while providing self-reflection by Koskenniemi on 
his project.36 The economics of international law is now a mainstream school of thought 
originating in the United States.37 The American Society of International Law awarded its 
2010 book prize to Beth Simmons’s influential empirical study of human rights law.38 The 
2012 publication of Gregory Shaffer and Tom Ginsburg’s ‘The Empirical Turn in Interna-
tional Legal Scholarship’ in the American Journal of International Law identifies an im-
portant turning point in predominantly American approaches to international law.39 With 
the the empirical turn we are beginning to see moves toward a behavioural turn, with a 
35 Symposium on Method in International Law (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 299; Steven 
R Ratner & Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Methods of International Law (ASIL 2004). 
36 Martti Koskeniemmi, ‘Letter to the Editors of the Symposium’ (1999) 93 American Journal of Interna-
tional Law 351. 
37 A comprehensive survey is impractical here. See, e.g., Eric A Posner & Alan O Sykes, Economic Founda-
tions of International Law (Harvard University Press 2013); Joel Trachtman, The Economic Structure of 
International Law (Harvard University Press 2008); Jeffrey Dunoff & Joel P Trachtman, ‘Economic Analysis 
of International Law’ (1999) 24 Yale Journal of International Law 1. An extensive set of papers can be found 
in a symposium issue on International Law and Economics in the Illinois Law Review in 2008 issue 1.  
38 Beth A Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights – International Law in Domestic Politics (Cambridge 
University Press 2009) 
39 Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, ‘The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship’ (2012) 106 
American Journal of International Law 1. 
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focus on the behavioural economics of international law, though one of the main contribu-
tors to this specialization, Anne Van Aaken, is on a European law faculty.40 These moves 
are not without critiques, of course, and the divisions by territory or nationality are by no 
means clear-cut. 
No empirics or exhaustive survey is offered here but it is fair to conclude that American 
approaches to inquiry about international law tends to be more instrumental and to rely on 
methods found in the American versions of the social sciences, while British and European 
approaches tend to more in the historical, philosophical, critical, and normative traditions. 
We should not lose focus on the influence of the New Haven School on American ap-
proaches to international law, which could be understood as implementing an instrumental 
vision of international law to globalize American values during the Cold War and in the 
pursuit of foreign policy aims.41 If one is not sensitive to these distinctions, one must accept 
the risk that important international law scholarship will be overlooked, because different 
questions are being asked in these disparate disciplinary terrains. 
II. A ROLE FOR THE CRITICAL
Another piece in the puzzle in the evolution of legal thought and how it affected inquiry 
about international law probably can be found in the rise of American Legal Realism in the 
40 Tomer Broude, ‘Behavioral International Law’ (2014) 163 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1099; 
Anne van Aaken, ‘Behavioural International Law and Economics’ (2014) 55 Harvard International Law 
Journal 421. Broude and Aaken are co-authoring a book on behavioural international law, which Oxford 
University Press is due to publish in 2019. 
41 See Oscar Schachter, ‘Remarks on McDougal’s Jurisprudence: Utility, Influence, Controversy’ (1985) 79 
American Society of International Law Proceedings 266; see also  Anne Marie Slaughter, Recueil de Cours, 
Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law 285 (Kluwer Law International 2000). 
15 
early twentieth century and what happened in its aftermath. Here we can find some reha-
bilitation of the differences in style or method of inquiry about law as between Britain, the 
wider Europe, and the United States. 
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, American law and legal thought diverged 
from English law but still was a net borrower of ideas and legislative innovations from 
Britain. German-influenced historical understandings of the law were also influential.42 
The well accepted notion has been that in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 
United States in a ‘classical’ stage of legal thought, which emphasised formal and concep-
tual reasoning about positive sources of law and supported an individualist approach to the 
organization of society.43 But historicism was also influential at the time, which sought to 
place law within a process of historical development. It could plausibly be argued that 
competing schools of jurisprudence, as between the historical and the analytical were pre-
sent in the United States in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.44 Eventually the 
analytical wing won the battle for the consensus of the epistemological community. But 
how it won tells us a story about the rise not only of the positive sciences in the United 
States but also about the rise and eventual fall of the American critical legal studies move-
ment, a movement that may more likely maintain a greater influence outside the United 
States at the present time, including on international law. The analytical wing did not rise 
to prominence in any linear chronology of progress in legal science, in which conceptual 
legal analysis was eventually displaced with a so-called more sophisticated social science 
42 David M Rabban, Law’s History: American Legal Thought and the Transatlantic Turn to History (Cam-
bridge University Press 2013).  
43 William M Wiecek, The Lost World of Classical Legal Thought (Oxford University Press 1998); Duncan 
Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Classical Legal Thought (Beard 2006). 
44 Rabban, n 42. 
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methodology. Rather, what happened was the rise of an eclectic group of scholars known 
at the American Legal Realists who forced pluralism into American legal thought, giving 
rise after their demise to a diverse range of modalities from law and economics, aligned 
with American conservativism and the legal right, to critical legal studies, aligned with 
American left liberals.45   
In the United States, American Legal Realism brought an end to the search only for a 
liberal individualist order in law – to law as an institutional replication of and support for 
liberal individualism. Legal conceptualism was the traditional means by which to support 
law in a liberal individualist frame. The trend of legal thought in the United States moved 
in the early to mid-twentieth century moved towards placing higher importance on under-
standing the social ends of law and began to place a lower-order emphasis on the logical 
features of the law and legal concepts. The traditional analysis of legal concepts has never 
lost significance in the United States. The deployment of legal concepts is essential to solv-
ing problems relating to liability forms of legal responsibility, forms of legal responsibility 
having to do with disputes among persons that have to be resolved in binary forms of op-
position of winners and losers of a legal case.46 But conceptual analysis cannot be the only 
game in town as a tool for the development of the law, where the aims of social forms of 
responsibility – beyond the single case – take on more importance. 
This move occurred in Britain too but sometime later, with the rise of socio-legal stud-
ies. But in the early to mid-twentieth century, legal thought in England, and Britain more 
generally, took a different course. The period in the history of legal thought when the 
45 See Roberto Mangabiera Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (Harvard University Press 1983). 
46 These concepts of responsibility are borrowed very loosely from Iris Marion Young, Responsibility for 
Justice (Oxford University Press 2013). 
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American Legal Realists were ascendant in America, from about 1930 to 1955, are approx-
imately in the period before HLA Hart began his appointment as Professor of Jurisprudence 
at Oxford in 1952. This was the period between John Austin and HLA Hart. 
When the history of legal thought is explored, rarely is anything said about the period 
between Austin and Hart, except perhaps about Maine’s historical jurisprudence, which 
seems to have had little lasting influence but which could be seen in the more general 
context of a historical move in the nineteenth century that may have been more significant 
in the United States than in the Britain. Neil Duxbury offers a critique of the period between 
Austin and Hart: ‘It would be wrong to assume that nothing happened in English jurispru-
dence between Austin’s era and Hart’s. It is just that nothing much happened that would 
be remembered’ and ‘[i]t seems fair to say . . . that English jurisprudence after Austin 
lacked imagination and direction’.47 English ‘jurisprudes’ of the day did not write jurispru-
dence as we know it today, though neither did the Legal Realists.48 Says Neil Duxbury, 
‘Americans who travel the neglected path that is English jurisprudence from the 1830s to 
the 1950s will soon find themselves in a world very different from their own. . . .’49 English 
jurisprudence focused on the analysis of legal concepts in this period. Duxbury explains 
that the English legal scholars of the day wrote papers about stare decisis and the role of 
precedent, the relationship between law and equity, statutory interpretation, the English 
47 Neil Duxbury, ‘English Jurisprudence Between Austin and Hart’, (2005) 91 Virginia Law Review 1, 3 and 
15.  
48 ‘Jurisprudes’ was a term that Llewellyn often used to describe legal realists and others who investigated 
questions about the role of law and its operation in society. Beyond our scope here are the internecine debates 
about what constitutes ‘jurisprudence’. Most legal scholars today think of American legal realism as some 
form of proto-social science about the law. Brian Leiter argues that it is a naturalised version of jurisprudence. 
B Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal Realism and Naturalism in Legal Philoso-
phy (Oxford University Press 2007).  
49 Duxbury, n 47, 5. 
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court system, the growth of negligence liability in tort law, the conceptual divisions be-
tween legal categories and other conceptual legal projects.50 In the field of international 
law, this may have manifested itself in the turn of British international lawyers toward 
arbitration and legal advocacy and that of American international lawyers toward foreign 
policy.51 So what we see here is not a break or even a Kuhnian paradigm shift as in the 
United States marked by Legal Realism, but a gradualism of cautious common law legal 
scholarship, more in the nature of normal science. 
One of the more influential figures of the time in Britain was Arthur Goodhart, who 
held the Chair in Jurisprudence that Hart would eventually hold for twenty years before 
Hart.52 Though Goodhart was careful to balance competing considerations in his inaugural 
lecture in 1932,53 Harold Laski, who chaired the lecture, wrote to Oliver Wendell Holmes 
Jr that Goodhart ‘thought clearly, that the realists . . . were just wicked’.54 CK Allen, 
Goodhart’s colleague at Oxford, described attempts to evaluate law using the social sci-
ences as ‘Megalomaniac Jurisprudence.’55 Says Duxbury, he considered Pound’s sociolog-
ical jurisprudence to be ‘inappropriately normative’ and that ‘legal realism filled him with 
feelings approximating disgust’.56 Said Allen: ‘It was perhaps appropriate that the age of 
jazz should produce a Jazz Jurisprudence.’57 Others at Oxford and particularly at the Lon-
don universities of the time were more receptive,58 The inaugural editorial board of the 
50 Ibid, 14. 
51 A special thanks to editors for directing me to this point. 
52 Ibid, 58. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid quoting Letter from Harold J. Laski to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. (20 January 1932) in M 
DeWolfe Howe (ed), 2 Holmes-Laski Letters (Harvard University Press 1953) 1358. 
55 CK Allen, Law in the Making, (3rd ed Oxford University Press 1939) 35, quoted in Duxbury, n 47, 61. 
56 Duxbury, n 47, 61. 
57 Allen, Law in the Making 55, quoted in Duxbury, n 47, 62. 
58 Duxbury, n 47, 63-9. 
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Modern Law Review invited the American Legal Realist Felix Cohen to write the very first 
article for the journal.59 But few academic law schools existed at the time in Britain and 
scholarship from the medieval universities such as Oxford carried great weight, not only 
in England but in the British sphere of influence in what were to become the Common-
wealth family of nations. 
One could suggest several related reasons for the divergence in the common law tradi-
tion. Ultimately the explanation will depend on the discipline in which the person offering 
it operates. A compelling explanation is sociological.60 American Legal Realism may have 
been a response to social and political events in the United States in the early twentieth 
century, in which classical legal thought was associated with a ‘laissez faire’ ideology of 
the United States Supreme Court of the time, which used its powers of judicial review to 
enforce freedom of contract doctrines, obstruct early attempts at regulating the economy, 
and make difficult the implementation of New Deal policies.61 It may also have been an 
attempt to undo so-called Langdellian approaches to the study of law in American law 
schools.62 Add to all of this that federalism in a large country that was undergoing signifi-
cant social change made it impossible to maintain consistency of case law across many 
jurisdictions and so American versions of the common law necessarily would lead to con-
tradictions in the case law. The US Supreme Court in Erie Railroad Co. v Tompkins63 is 
59 Felix S Cohen, ‘The Problems of a Functional Jurisprudence’ (1937) 1 Modern Law Review 5. 
60 See Duxbury, n 47, 55-6: 
It would be a mistake to expect English jurisprudence to take much from the lessons that 
were being learned in the United States. American legal realism, after all, was a jurispru-
dential response to the dominance of Langdellianism in the law schools, the initiatives of 
the American Law Institute, the perceived and some of the legal problems posed by the 
New Deal. (footnote omitted). 
61 For a summary, see Edwin Chemerinsky, ‘Substantive Dues Process’ (1999) 15 Touro Law Review 1501. 
62 Duxbury, n 47, 55-6. 
63 304 U.S. 64 (1938) 
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widely understood to have settled the point that the common law resided in the states, lead-
ing eventually to the common law comprising essentially only private law in the United 
States and an ideological stance that the common law was unsuitable for public law, with 
its values hewing more closely to liability than social forms of legal responsibility. 
Duxbury concludes: ‘North American commentators were concluding by the 1960s that 
English jurisprudence and American jurisprudence were each motivated by different con-
cerns, and that the English had but the flimsiest understanding of realist legal thought. It is 
difficult to argue that this conclusion is wrong.’64  
The result has been a pluralism in legal thought and method that is now accepted with-
out controversy and even expected in the American legal academy, and which has had a 
hand in promoting a global epistemological pluralism in inquiry about the law. The Amer-
ican Legal Realists pushed open the doors to both the analytical wing of legal thought, with 
a focus on positive science, and critical wing, the critical legal studies movement of the 
1960s. The result is that American legal inquiry has had plenty of opportunity to be inter-
disciplinary in diverse ways for quite some time. In Britain, American Legal Realism was 
a transplant. In the United States it was indigenous. This is not a story about ‘progress’ but 
a push away from a universalism about how to think about the law that tended to rigidly 
support a status quo and elite status for some. 
Philosophers of social science divide the study of the social world into the projects of 
meaning versus causal adequacy. A legal conceptualist sees her work from the standpoint 
of the meanings of legal concepts. A social scientist sees her work in explaining why, in 
determining cause and effect. So, while a conceptualist argues that a legal text should be 
64 Duxbury, n 47. 
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interpreted to mean x, she has no tools to assess whether that interpretation will cause legal 
agents to act in a particular way in response to the law.  The social scientist does have these 
tools to predict behaviour but lacks the tools to advise on the meaning of the legal text as 
x. These sorts of exercises are where the narrow technical competence of modern science
leads us. American Legal Realism is an ancestral movement that allows us to accept what 
might seem as oppositional epistemologies without confusion. Critique, or critical legal 
studies, provides us with the means by which to expose the limits of approaches to the 
study of law based in meaning or causal adequacy and to expose where the confusions just 
might be. Meaning adequacy has been a central target of critical legal studies from its very 
beginnings. Causal adequacy is defeated once its foundations in reductionism are exposed. 
For a critical theorist, social science arguments are tautological. 
For domestic law, critical legal studies is currently at best a minority position. It has 
been proclaimed to be dead in the United States, but it is not, for reasons that go beyond 
this chapter.65 It has more vibrancy in Britain and Europe but on the domestic law front 
remains a minority position. For international law, critical legal studies seems to have a 
natural home, at least in the European tradition. Of course, critical studies is not unique to 
the United States. The influences on the American critical legal studies are in Marx, the 
Frankfurt School, Gramsci, and Foucault, among others. American Legal Realism opened 
up a particular approach to the critical study of the law and make it internal to the practices 
of contemporary legal scholars. 
Critique works as a practice to study international law because it provides a degree of 
detachment other approaches cannot. It is not really a method but the articulation of a 
65 Mark Tushnet, ‘Survey Article: Critical Legal Theory (without Modifiers) in the United States’ (2005) The 
Journal of Political Philosophy 99 
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standpoint. It does not entirely free us of our human psychology and social context. There 
is no view from nowhere and we are not perfectly rational beings. But it takes us an addi-
tional step removed from somewhere. This seems an important technique or facility when 
dealing with international law, which does not connect to a particular political constitution. 
Critique provides the means by which to disentangle national ideologies. It permits us to 
question liberalism as well as authoritarianism. But critique does not provide us with a 
value theory.66 The end of critique is critique. 
CONCLUSION 
The notion of a comparative international law applies not only to the law itself and its 
practice by states and other legal actors but also to the methods used to study it. This chap-
ter lays some of the groundwork by which to study differences as primarily between Amer-
ican, British and European approaches to inquiry about international law. The differences 
tend to center on the use of methods of the analytical and empirical sciences to study the 
law. These approaches currently enjoy the label of interdisciplinary studies of the law but 
what is coming or may already be here is an organic legal studies or legal analysis distinct 
from the conceptual analysis of legal doctrine. 
I will concede my own scientific allegiances and suggest that a cognitive or psycholog-
ical account may help to explain what is happening, but research is necessary to so find. 
As a matter of anecdotal observation, a distinctive form of nationalism in inquiry about the 
law seems to be occurring. This nationalism seems more pervasive in law than in other 
disciplines, though some other disciplines have national schools of thought, usually with 
blurred lines. Explanations as to why law and its study might be nationalistic in orientation 
66 See Koskenniemi, n 4 and n 36 at 356. 
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cannot be undertaken without empirical work in the psychology of legal judgment. At first 
blush it seems a form of identity-protective cognition about the most important tribal norms 
for societies.67 No other area of academic inquiry appears as resistant to penetration of 
ideas across borders than inquiry about the law. There just might be a corrosive ideological 
character to the law and its study. To some extent we expect different evolutions in the law, 
based on historical and social contingencies. But we must have adequate information and 
workable theories to know when enough is enough. 
67 See Dan M Kahan, ‘Laws of Cognition and Cognition of Law’ (2015) 135 Cognition 56. 
